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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
The State of Idaho appeals from the district court’s order granting suppression. The
state challenges the district court’s determination that a parolee has the same expectation
of privacy as a non-parolee in an encounter with an officer if the officer is unaware of the
defendant’s parole status. The state also challenges the ruling that frisking a person for
weapons where that person is present at the scene of a suspected shooting, and the gun used
in the shooting is still believed to be at that scene, is not reasonable.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Officers Trent Schneider and Joe Martinez responded to a report of a shooting at
an apartment where intoxicated people, other than the person shot, were still present and
the whereabouts of the gun used in the shooting was unknown. (Tr., p. 14, L. 24 – p. 15,
L. 18; p. 19, Ls. 5-16.) As officers approached the front of the apartment a man, later
identified as Isaac Lyle Saldivar, walked from around the back of the apartment. (Tr., p.
15, Ls. 22-25.) Because of the circumstances, the officers detained Saldivar and frisked
him. (Tr., p. 15, L. 25 – p. 16, L. 24.) They found a stolen handgun in his left front pants
pocket. (R., p. 54.) Officers arrested Saldivar, ran a warrant check and, upon learning of
an outstanding arrest warrant, arrested him. (Tr., p. 16, L. 25 – p. 18, L. 19.) The gun in
Saldivar’s pocket was the only gun the officers found at the scene of the shooting. (R., p.
54.)
Saldivar was also at that time on parole. (Tr., p. 28, L. 10 – p. 29, L. 12; State’s
Exhibit 1.) As part of his parole agreement Saldivar consented to searches of his person
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and waived his “rights under the Fourth Amendment and the Idaho constitution concerning
searches.” (State’s Exhibit 1.)
The state charged Saldivar with unlawful possession of a firearm. (R., pp. 29-30.)
Saldivar filed a motion to suppress, claiming that he was illegally seized and improperly
subjected to a frisk search. (R., pp. 49-52, 108-11.) The state objected to the motion,
asserting that as a parolee Saldivar did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy; that
the stop and frisk were lawful; and that suppression was not an appropriate remedy because
of inevitable discovery. (R., pp. 71-87, 98-106.)
The district court granted the motion, finding that Saldivar was improperly frisked,
that he had a right to privacy despite his parole waiver because officers were unaware of
the waiver, and that the inevitable discovery doctrine was not applicable because the arrest
on an arrest warrant (which would have revealed the gun in a search incident to arrest) was
not part of a different investigation. (R., pp. 114-23.) The state filed a notice of appeal
within 42 days of the district court’s order. (R., pp. 137-38.)
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ISSUES
1.
Did the district court err by concluding that Saldivar retained a privacy right despite
his parole status and waiver of his rights against police searches?
2.
Did the district court err by concluding that the frisk of Saldivar was unreasonable
despite his presence at the scene of a shooting where officers believed a gun was still
present?
3.
Did the district court err by requiring an “additional line of inquiry” before the
inevitable discovery doctrine would apply?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred By Concluding That Saldivar Retained A Privacy Right Despite
His Parole Status And Waiver Of His Rights Against Police Searches
A.

Introduction
As a condition of parole, Saldivar waived his rights and agreed to submit to searches

of his person by law enforcement. (State’s Exhibit 1.) The district court held that this
waiver of rights was only effective where law enforcement officers were aware of it, and
therefore Saldivar demonstrated that he had a privacy right infringed by the frisk search
conducted by the officers. (R., pp. 120-21.) This holding is incompatible with the
precedents of the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Idaho.

B.

Standard Of Review
This Court reviews suppression motion orders with a bifurcated standard. State v.

Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 418, 337 P.3d 575, 577 (2014). When a decision on a motion to
suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court’s findings of fact that are
not clearly erroneous, but freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to those
facts. Id.

C.

The District Court Erred By Applying An Incorrect Legal Standard
Constitutional protections against unreasonable searches and seizures “apply only

to a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy—one which the party subjectively held and
which society is willing to recognize as reasonable.” State v. Ashworth, 148 Idaho 700,
702, 228 P.3d 381, 383 (Ct. App. 2010). “A person challenging a search has the burden of
showing that he or she had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the item or place
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searched.” State v. Pruss, 145 Idaho 623, 626, 181 P.3d 1231, 1234 (2008) (citing
Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980)).
Whether protections against unreasonable searches and seizures apply “involves a
two-part inquiry: (1) Did the person have a subjective expectation of privacy in the object
of the challenged search? and (2) Is society willing to recognize that expectation as
reasonable?” Id. at 626, 181 P.3d at 1234. See
also ------Ashworth, 148 Idaho at 702, 228 P.3d
- --at 383 (“Therefore, a Fourth Amendment analysis involves a determination of whether the
defendant had an actual, subjective expectation of privacy and, if so, whether the
defendant’s expectation of privacy, when viewed objectively, was reasonable under the
circumstances.”); State v. Fancher, 145 Idaho 832, 837, 186 P.3d 688, 693 (Ct. App. 2008)
(“An expectation of privacy is objectively reasonable when it is legitimate, justifiable, and
one society should both recognize and protect.”). “The burden is on the defendant to prove
the existence of a legitimate expectation of privacy.” State v. Spencer, 139 Idaho 736, 739,
85 P.3d 1135, 1138 (Ct. App. 2004).
“Idaho appellate courts have long-recognized that parolees and probationers have
a diminished expectation of privacy and will enforce Fourth Amendment waivers as a
condition of parole or probation.” State v. Cruz, 144 Idaho 906, 908, 174 P.3d 876, 878
(Ct. App. 2007). See
also -------------Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006); United States v.
- --Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001). “[P]ersons conditionally released to societies have a
reduced expectation of privacy, thereby rendering intrusions by government authorities
‘reasonable’ which otherwise would be unreasonable or invalid under traditional
constitutional concepts.” State v. Gawron, 112 Idaho 841, 843, 736 P.2d 1295, 1297
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(1987). Thus, “the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a police officer from conducting
a suspicionless search of a parolee.” Samson, 547 U.S. at 856.
Application of these standards shows Saldivar did not have a subjectively held
privacy right that society would recognize as reasonable. Saldivar did not testify that he
believed he had a right to be free of a frisk search by officers who were unaware of his
parole status. If he had so testified there is no reason such a belief would be considered
reasonable. The waiver he signed certainly makes no provision for officer knowledge, nor
does it indicate that waived rights are restored if an officer is unaware of the waiver.
(State’s Exhibit 1.) That Saldivar in fact subjectively and reasonably believed he had a
right to not be searched after he affirmatively waived his right to not be searched is not
shown on this record. Saldivar failed to prove he had an expectation of privacy, and
therefore failed to demonstrate that the Fourth Amendment even applied in this case.
The district court did not apply the standards articulated by the Supreme Court of
the United States and the appellate courts of the State of Idaho. (R., pp. 120-21.) Rather,
it applied Ninth Circuit and Maryland precedent. (Id. (citing cases).) The authority relied
on by the district court is incompatible with the standards articulated by the Supreme and
the Idaho courts.
In Moreno v. Baca, 431 F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 2005) (cited at R., p. 120), the Ninth
Circuit addressed whether Moreno, a parolee, had “‘standing’” to challenge the seizure and
search of his person. Id. at 640-41. The court concluded that cases addressing “‘standing’”
addressed a “question as to whether the person challenging the search had standing because
he or she lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched or the thing
seized.” Id. at 640. “By contrast there is no question that Moreno had standing to challenge

6

the search and seizure of his own person.” Id. at 641. The court’s holding that a parolee
enjoys the same expectation of privacy against search or seizure of his person as that of a
non-parolee is contrary to the above-cited authority of the Supreme Court of the United
States and the Idaho appellate courts.
In Samson, 547 U.S. at 846 (decided a year after Moreno), the officer stopped and
searched Samson’s person. The Court held that “the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit
a police officer from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee.” Id. at 857. In State
v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 208-10, 207 P.3d 182, 184-86 (2009), a probation condition
that Purdum submit to warrantless and suspicionless BAC testing meant the officer
properly seized and searched Purdum’s person. The analysis of Moreno, that a parolee has
the same privacy rights in his person as a non-parolee, is directly contrary to precedent.
The reasoning of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland is similarly flawed.
That court reasoned that “a constitutionally defective search cannot be justified after the
fact by information unknown to the officer at the time of the warrantless search.” State v.
Donaldson, 108 A.3d 500, 506 (Md. App. 2015). The state’s position in this case is not
(nor has it ever been) that the search was “justified” by the parole waiver. Indeed, the state
stipulates (for purposes of this argument only) that the search and seizure were not
“justified” by reasonable suspicion. The state’s only position is that Saldivar did not have
a subjective expectation of privacy that society would recognize as reasonable, and
therefore could not assert that the rights he specifically waived had been violated even if
the officer’s conduct did not otherwise meet Fourth Amendment standards.
Saldivar had the burden of establishing that his “‘own protection was infringed by
the search and seizure.’” Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138 (1978) (quoting Simmons v.

7

United States, 390 U.S. 377, 389 (1968)). See also Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88
(1998) (“[I]n order to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment, a defendant must
demonstrate that he personally has an expectation of privacy in the place searched, and that
his expectation is reasonable; i.e., one that has a source outside of the Fourth Amendment,
either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to understandings that
are recognized and permitted by society.” (internal quotation omitted)); State v. Bordeaux,
148 Idaho 1, 9, 217 P.3d 1, 9 (Ct. App. 2009) (“The rule is well established that in order to
assert standing to suppress evidence, the individual seeking suppression must demonstrate
some proprietary interest in the premises searched or some other interest giving a
reasonable expectation of privacy.”); State v. Foldesi, 131 Idaho 778, 780, 963 P.2d 1215,
1217 (Ct. App. 1998) (“Since an illegal search violates the rights only of those who have
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place or property searched, only those with such
a privacy interest may obtain suppression of the fruits of the search.” (emphasis added)).
This is because “Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights” that “may not be
vicariously asserted.” Rakas, 439 U.S. at 133-34 (internal quotations omitted). “A person
who is aggrieved by an illegal search and seizure only through the introduction of
damaging evidence secured by a search of a third person’s premises or property has not
had any of his Fourth Amendment rights infringed.” Id. at 134 (emphasis added). See also
United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731 (1980) (“a court may not exclude evidence
under the Fourth Amendment unless it finds that an unlawful search or seizure violated the
defendant’s own constitutional rights”). Thus, even if an illegal search were established,
the exclusionary rule applies only to “defendants whose Fourth Amendment rights have
been violated.” Rakas, 439 U.S. at 134. See also Byrd v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 138
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S. Ct. 1518, 1530 (2018) (“a person must have a cognizable Fourth Amendment interest in
the place searched before seeking relief for an unconstitutional search”). Simply put, the
defendant “bears the burden of proving” that “he had a legitimate expectation of privacy”
infringed by the illegal search. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980) (holding
there was no expectation of privacy in a companion’s purse). The question is not whether
the search was improper, but “whether governmental officials violated any legitimate
expectation of privacy held by petitioner.” Id. at 106. Regardless of the constitutionality
of the challenged search, a “defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights are violated only when
the challenged conduct invaded his legitimate expectation of privacy.” United States v.
Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731 (1980) (emphasis original).
Under this well-established rubric, a decision that the movant seeking suppression
lacks a privacy interest infringed by the governmental action ends the inquiry without
regard for whether the challenged search or seizure was otherwise justified. Thus, in
Carter, 525 U.S. at 91, the Supreme Court concluded because “respondents had no
legitimate expectation of privacy” in the place they alleged was improperly searched, it
need not reach the question of whether there had even been a search. In Gawron, 112 Idaho
at 843, 736 P.2d at 1297, the Idaho Supreme Court acknowledged that the search “may
well have exceeded the permissible limits” of a constitutional search, but that did not matter
because it was within the scope of Gawron’s Fourth Amendment waiver as a condition of
probation. See also Purdum, 147 Idaho at 210, 207 P.3d at 186 (probation term allowing
random blood or breath tests “at any time and at any place by any law enforcement officer”
allowed search and seizure to conduct random blood and breath tests). Whether the search
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at issue in this case was otherwise constitutionally justified is simply irrelevant if Saldivar’s
reasonable expectation of privacy was not infringed.
It was not. “[T]he touchstone of [Fourth] Amendment analysis has been the
question whether a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of
privacy.” Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (internal quotation omitted).
Saldivar’s waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights extinguished his expectation of privacy.
Gawron, 112 Idaho at 843, 736 P.2d at 1297. The Supreme Court of the United States has
held, “the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a police officer from conducting a
suspicionless search of a parolee.” Samson, 547 U.S. at 857. The district court’s holding
that the officer’s ignorance of Saldivar’s parole status and waiver restored Saldivar’s
privacy expectation to the same as a non-parolee who had not waived his Fourth
Amendment rights is without basis.

Indeed, bestowing a privacy interest on every

individual unless the officers know that no privacy interest exists would confer almost
limitless privacy interests, and completely eviscerate the two-step analysis set forth by
controlling precedent.

The district court erred by adding a requirement of officer

knowledge to the expectation of privacy inquiry.
Saldivar failed to establish that he had an expectation of privacy infringed by his
detention and frisk for weapons. He therefore failed to show that any of the evidence the
state acquired in this case was obtained by an unlawful search or seizure. The district
court’s conclusion that the evidence should be suppressed anyway because Officer
Schneider could not have realized his actions were lawful is without legal or logical basis.
Because Saldivar’s rights were not violated, he was not entitled to suppression. The district
court erred and should be reversed.
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II.
The Frisk Was Constitutionally Reasonable
A.

Introduction
The district court concluded that officers lacked sufficient justification to frisk

Saldivar for weapons. (R., pp. 117-120. 1) In doing so the district court concluded that the
nature of the possible crime and presence of a gun at the scene were not enough, without
more, to justify a frisk for weapons. It is well-established, however, that the nature of the
crime can be a determinative factor in justifying a frisk. Add in reason to believe that a
gun was present and the officer had reasonable suspicion Saldivar could be armed and
dangerous. Because the district court employed an erroneous legal standard, it committed
reversible error.

B.

Standard Of Review
This Court reviews a district court’s order resolving a motion to suppress “using a

bifurcated standard of review.” State v. Huffaker, 160 Idaho 400, 404, 374 P.3d 563, 567
(2016). “This Court accepts the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly

1

The district court’s factual findings include one finding that may be clearly erroneous,
depending on how it is interpreted. The district court stated there was no evidence that
Officer Schneider considered Saldivar to be dangerous, and that the evidence showed the
officer patted down Saldivar because of standard operating procedure. (R., p. 115.) Officer
Schneider did testify that he conducted the frisk because it is standard operating procedure
to frisk anyone they place in handcuffs, but that he undertook these safety measures of
cuffing and frisking for “[o]fficer safety reasons only” and was concerned for officer safety
because “there was a gun involved.” (Tr., p. 16, Ls. 5-21.) Because the cuffing was not
standard procedure, but initiated based on officer safety concerns, the evidence establishes
that the safety precautions of cuffing, followed by frisking, were both undertaken because
of safety concerns arising from the recent use of a gun in a shooting. The evidence
establishes that Officer Schneider cuffed and frisked Saldivar based upon safety concerns
arising exclusively from the fact of the presence of a gun, recently used in a shooting, at
the apartment, and not from any fact particular to Saldivar.
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erroneous, but may freely review the trial court’s application of constitutional principles in
light of those facts.” Id.

C.

The Frisk For Possible Weapons Was Reasonable Because Saldivar Was Present
At The Scene Of A Shooting Where A Gun Was Believed To Still Be
An officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, “conduct a limited self-

protective pat down search of a detainee in order to remove any weapons.” State v. Henage,
143 Idaho 655, 660, 152 P.3d 16, 21 (2007) (citing State v. Wright, 134 Idaho 79, 82, 996
P.2d 298, 301 (2000)). Such searches are “evaluated in light of the facts known to the
officers on the scene and the inference of the risk of danger reasonably drawn from the
totality of the circumstances.” Henage, 143 Idaho at 660, 152 P.3d at 21 (quotations and
citation omitted). The ultimate inquiry is an objective one, which requires the court to
consider whether the facts available to the officer would “warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.” Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 22 (1968)). Such protective searches are allowed in situations where a “danger may
arise from the possible presence of weapons in the area surrounding a suspect.” Michigan
v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983).
The Idaho Supreme Court has further held that “[a] person can be armed without
posing a risk of danger,” such that the mere knowledge that an individual has a weapon is
insufficient to justify a frisk; there must also be a basis for concluding the armed individual
is dangerous. Henage, 143 Idaho at 660, 152 P.3d at 21. “Several factors influence whether
a reasonable person in the officer’s position would conclude that a particular person was
armed and dangerous.” State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 819, 203 P.3d 1203, 1218 (2009).
The factors include whether: (1) “there were any bulges in the suspect’s clothing that
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resembled a weapon”; (2) “the encounter took place at night or in a high crime area”; (3)
“the individual made threatening or furtive movements”; (4) “the individual indicated that
he or she possessed a weapon”; (5) “the individual appeared to be under the influence of
alcohol or illegal drugs”; (6) the individual “was unwilling to cooperate”; and (7) the
individual “had a reputation for dangerousness.” Id. (citations omitted). This list is neither
exclusive nor exhaustive, however, because the “test is an objective one that asks whether,
under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonably prudent person would be justified in
concluding that the individual posed a risk of danger.” Id. at 818, 203 P.3d at 1217.
“Whether any of these circumstances, taken together or by themselves, are enough to
justify a Terry frisk depends on an analysis of the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 819,
203 P.3d at 1218.
In this case officers found Saldivar possibly leaving an apartment where there had
been a “recent shooting.” (R., pp. 114-15.) The information officers had was that the gun
was still at the scene of the shooting. (Tr., p. 15, Ls. 6-15.) Given the nature of the potential
crime, the involvement of a gun that was still at the scene, and Saldivar’s potential
connection to the potential crime, the gun, and the location, officers were justified in taking
the reasonable approach of frisking Saldivar.
The district court discounted Saldivar’s potential dangerousness by concluding that
although “[p]roximity to the scene of a dangerous crime does factor into the reasonableness
inquiry,” it “does not by itself justify a frisk.” (R., pp. 118-19.) This is an erroneous legal
standard.
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First, the very case cited by the district court (with a “cf.” citation) does not say that
the nature of the suspected crime is not enough alone to justify a frisk. The court cited2
Bishop, 146 Idaho at 819, 203 P.3d at 1218. In Bishop, however, the Court, after listing
several factors including whether the encounter was in a high crime area, stated, “Whether
any of these circumstances, taken together or by themselves, are enough to justify a Terry
frisk depends on an analysis of the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 819, 203 P.3d at
1218 (emphasis added). The Bishop opinion simply does not support the district court’s
holding that “[p]roximity to the scene of a dangerous crime … does not by itself justify a
frisk.” (R., p. 118.) Rather, it stands for the proposition that a single factor may justify a
frisk. Moreover, there is a large analytical difference between presence in a “high crime
area” (R., pp. 118-19 (quoting Bishop, 146 Idaho at 819, 203 P.3d at 1218)), and presence
at an actual shooting where the gun is still believed to be located.
Indeed, the district court’s minimization of the nature of the suspected crime is
directly contrary to Idaho precedent. In State v. Burgess, 104 Idaho 559, 661 P.2d 344 (Ct.
App. 1983), officers responded to a burglar alarm at a tavern and found Burgess walking
through a parking lot “some twenty feet” from the tavern, stopped him, questioned him,
and frisked him finding burglary tools. The court found the stop and frisk reasonable,
stating: “It is not unreasonable to believe that burglars can be armed and dangerous.” Id.
at 561, 661 P.2d at 346.
The case of In the Matter of Doe, 145 Idaho 980, 188 P.3d 922 (Ct. App. 2008),
also involved a suspect stopped for burglary who was found near a church and who

2

There is an obvious typo in the court’s citation. (R., p. 118.) In context, however, it is
clear the district court was citing to Bishop, 146 Idaho at 819, 203 P.3d at 1218.
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generally matched the description of someone reportedly seeking to gain access to the
building at night. The court noted that “[s]everal jurisdictions have concluded that certain
crimes, like burglary, by their very nature are so suggestive of the presence and use of
weapons that a frisk is always reasonable when officers have reasonable suspicion that an
individual might be involved in such a crime.” Id. at 983, 188 P.3d at 925. The court
declined to “adopt a bright line rule,” but did acknowledge that “specific circumstances
combined with certain crimes like burglary make it much more likely that a suspect will be
armed and dangerous.” Id. at 983-84, 188 P.3d at 925-26. Because Doe “could have been
in possession of burglary tools … that could easily have been used as weapons,” the frisk
was “justified.” Id. at 984, 188 P.3d at 926. See also Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40,
74 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“I think that, as in Terry, the right to frisk is automatic
when an officer lawfully stops a person suspected of a crime whose nature creates a
substantial likelihood that he is armed”); Henage, 143 Idaho at 663, 152 P.3d at 24
(Schroeder, J., specially concurring) (“The right to frisk can arise simply from the nature
of the possible crime the officer is investigating.” (Citing Terry, 392 U.S. 1)).
Here there was more than a mere suggestion that the crime at issue may involve a
weapon. To the contrary, the officers had every reason to believe that a gun was involved
in a potentially criminal shooting at the apartment Saldivar was walking away from.
Officer Schneider testified that he was responding to an apartment where a woman had
been shot, that “there were other people inside that were intoxicated, and a gun was still
inside.” (Tr., p. 15, Ls. 6-15.) He stopped Saldivar and cuffed and frisked him for officer
safety reasons because “[t]here was a gun involved” and he wished to be “sure there [were]
no guns pulled on ourselves or others.” (Tr., p. 16, Ls. 13-21.) The district court erred

15

when it concluded that more was required to stop and frisk Saldivar than suspicion that
Saldivar was leaving a potential shooting scene where the gun was believed to be located.

III.
The District Court Erred By Requiring An “Additional Line Of Inquiry” Before The
Inevitable Discovery Doctrine Would Apply
A.

Introduction
Even if the frisk were constitutionally unreasonable, Saldivar’s lawful arrest

pursuant to an outstanding warrant made the discovery of the gun inevitable, and therefore
not subject to suppression.

The district court rejected application of the inevitable

discovery doctrine because the state did not prove “that some additional line of
investigation would have inevitably resulted in the evidence being discovered.” (R., p. 122
(citing State v. Liechty, 152 Idaho 163, 170, 267 P.3d 1278, 1285 (Ct. App. 2011)). This
is an incorrect legal standard. By applying an incorrect legal standard the district court
erred.

B.

Standard Of Review
“When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the Court accepts the trial

court’s findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the
application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.” State v. McNeely, 162 Idaho
413, 414-15, 398 P.3d 146, 147-48 (2017) (internal quotation omitted). See also State v.
Davis, 162 Idaho 874, 876, 406 P.3d 886, 888 (Ct. App. 2017).
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C.

The District Court Applied An Incorrect Legal Standard To The State’s Claim Of
Inevitable Discovery
“The exclusionary rule is the judicial remedy for addressing illegal searches and

bars the admission or use of evidence gathered pursuant to the illegal search.” State v.
Bunting, 142 Idaho 908, 915, 136 P.3d 379, 386 (Ct. App. 2006). “The United States
Supreme Court has articulated the three exceptions” to the exclusionary rule, “independent
origin, inevitable discovery, and attenuated basis.” Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 495, 36
P.3d 1278, 1283 (2001). The question underlying all three exceptions “is whether, granting
establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has
been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently
distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 488 (1963) (internal quotation omitted).
The inevitable discovery rule applies in this case. 3 The inevitable discovery
doctrine makes suppression of evidence improper where, even if the evidence was actually
obtained by constitutionally improper means, the prosecution establishes by a

3

The state does not challenge the district court’s ultimate conclusion that the attenuation
doctrine does not apply. The state concedes that the discovery of the gun preceded the
discovery of the outstanding warrant, and therefore there was no intervening circumstance
that would have attenuated said discovery. The state disputes the district court’s
determination that any “misconduct by law enforcement was purposeful and flagrant.” (R.,
p. 122.) Although, as stated by the district court, the officer testified that it was “standard
operating procedure” to frisk “anyone that is put in cuffs” (R., pp. 116, 122), the officer
testified that he put Saldivar in cuffs (and therefore frisked him) because he was concerned
for the safety of officers and others because “[t]here was a gun involved.” (Tr., p. 15, L.
22 – p. 16, L. 21.) Officer Schneider did not testify that safety precautions such as cuffing
and frisking are routinely taken for investigative stops—quite the contrary. Indeed, a
policy that officers frisk where they have legitimate concerns for safety that justify
handcuffing is both constitutional and laudable. That Officer Schneider took both
precautions of cuffing and frisking out of safety concerns was not purposeful or flagrant
misconduct.
17

preponderance of proof that the evidence inevitably would have been found by lawful
means. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984); Stuart, 136 Idaho at 497-98, 36 P.3d
at 1285-86. The underlying rationale of this rule is that suppression should leave the
prosecution in the same position it would have been absent the police misconduct, not a
worse one. Nix, 467 U.S. at 442-44; State v. Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho 96, 102, 57 P.3d 807,
813 (Ct. App. 2002).
Here Officer Schneider testified that, after identifying Saldivar, police ran a
warrants check, learned of an outstanding arrest warrant, and arrested Saldivar on that
arrest warrant. (Tr., p. 17, Ls. 1-10; R., p. 54.) The search incident to that arrest would
have revealed the gun in Saldivar’s pocket had it not been previously removed because of
the frisk. (Tr., p. 17, L. 11 – p. 18, L. 19.) The facts of this case show that the gun would
have been discovered in a valid search incident to arrest but for it having been previously
found in the frisk. Thus, even granting establishment of the primary illegality, the gun
would inevitably have been discovered by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged
of the primary taint.
The district court, citing Liechty, 152 Idaho at 170, 267 P.3d at 1285, concluded
the state did not prove “that some additional line of investigation would have inevitably
resulted in the evidence being discovered.” (R., p. 122.) However, more recently, in State
v. Rowland, 158 Idaho 784, 352 P.3d 506 (Ct. App. 2015), the Court of Appeals clarified
this proposition, stating that the lawful means which would have uncovered the evidence
“need not be the result of a wholly independent investigation ... they must be the result of
some action that actually took place (or was in the process of taking place) that would
inevitably have led to the discovery of the unlawfully obtained evidence.” Id. at 787, 352
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P.3d at 509. More to the point, the Idaho Supreme Court has stated “the inevitable
discovery doctrine asks courts to engage in a hypothetical finding into the lawful actions
law enforcement would have inevitably taken in the absence of the unlawful avenue that
led to the evidence.” State v. Downing, 163 Idaho 26, 31, 407 P.3d 1285, 1290 (2017)
(emphasis original). Thus, while the inevitable discovery exception does not permit the
court to speculate on the course of action the investigation could have taken in the absence
of the constitutional violation, “even if that alternate course likely would have yielded the
evidence,” it must “presuppose inevitable hypotheticals running in parallel to the illegal
actions.” Id. at 32, 407 P.3d at 1291.
The underlying rationale of the inevitable discovery doctrine is that a
preponderance of the evidence proves that some action that actually took place, or was in
the process of taking place, would have led to the discovery of the evidence that was
already obtained through unlawful police action. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 448-49; Bunting,
142 Idaho at 916, 136 P.3d at 387. Because the warrants check, discovery of the warrant,
and arrest thereon were police actions that in fact took place without regard for the frisk,
and a search incident to the warranted arrest would have discovered the gun, evidence of
the gun in Saldivar’s pocket was not suppressible.
The district court applied an incorrect standard. Application of the correct legal
standard leads to the opposite result. The district court should be reversed.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the district court’s order
suppressing evidence.
DATED this 24th day of October, 2018.
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